Facilities accommodating suicide in 1945
Plus Air Intelligence Group distribution to Marine and Naval Aviation Squadrons, Groups and Wings (800). Note.--Numbers in parentheses indicate number of copies sent to each addressee. List 10 m (3) only to Ford Instrument Co., Long Island City, N. List 11 Sec Nav (1); Under Sec Nav (1); Asst Sec Nav Air (1); Gen Bd (1); Bu Aero (6); Bu Pers (6); CNO (6); Bu Ord (G); Bu Ships (6); Bu Y& D (2); USMC (10); USCG (10). That the Japanese will intensify their suicidal effort in coming months is certain. --ii-- Suicide air attacks against our surface forces, inaugurated during the Philippines campaign, were continued at an increased tempo during the Okinawa operation.Hits and damaging near misses were scored in 45 percent of the crash attempts, as compared with 54 percent for the earlier period.Even more startling is the fact that 27 suicide tries were required to sink a ship in February-May as compared with 14 in October-January. List 2 b(2); c(2) only to ASDev Lant; c(l) less Airship A/S Tr. List 7 a-l(2); c-l(2) only to NOB, Navy #115; f(5); g(30); h(5); i-3(5). Rather than picket stations, as in the Okinawa campaign, suiciders will concentrate on troop and cargo transports and large amphibious craft in an effort to defeat the landing operation at the beachhead. Float and training planes, as well as combat types, will be employed in large numbers. Standard Navy Distribution List Part 1--15 June 1945 List 1 a(5) less Com So Atl Flt, Com Nav Naw, Com Twelfth Flt, Com Tenth Flt, send Cin CPac 20 copies; b(2); c(2) send Com Air For Pac 10 copies; d(2); e(2); f(l) only to Com Sub Lant and Com Sub For Pac; g(2); h(2); i(2); j(4); k(2); 1(2) only to Com Min Pac, Com Nav Grp China, Com Nav Liaison Officer, British Pac-Flt, Com Nav Liaison Officer, British East Indies. Even bombardments of Japanese coastal cities, such as those by ships of Task Force 38 in mid-July, will not draw the Japanese air force out of hiding. The supreme suicidal effort of the enemy will coincide with the next amphibious operation.
The following table shows the record of Task Force 58 as compared with that of other combatant and noncombatant forces during the 3-month period: The success of Task Force 58 is attributed to: 1. The reason the enemy has concentrated on suicide attacks rather than the conventional methods is revealed clearly in an analysis of the relative effectiveness of suicide and nonsuicide attacks.At Iwo Jima in February the only suicide attacks occurred between 17.In March, on the other hand, when attacks occurred in the Kyushu-Okinawa area, nearly all firing at enemy aircraft was done at dawn.This Anti-Suicide Action Summary is SECRET and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 76, U. It will be seen in table I that, even during the month of April, when the enemy made his strongest suicidal effort, only 35 percent of the planes taken under fire by ships were suicide planes. Registered Mail is authorized in accordance with Article 76 (15) (e) and (f), U. During the period February-May, which saw the occupation of Iwo Jima, strikes against Tokyo and Kyushu, and the invasion of Okinawa, an estimated 1,100 enemy aircraft sortied with suicidal intent to attack our surface forces.